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Abstract:  In 2013 the OECD released its 15 point Action plan to deal with base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS).  In that plan it was recognised that BEPS has a significant effect on 
developing countries.  This is because the lack of tax revenue can lead to a critical 
underfunding of public investment that would help promote economic growth.  To this end, 
the BEPS project is aimed at ensuring an inclusive approach to take into account not only 
views of the G20 and OECD countries but also the perspective of developing nations.  With 
this focus in mind and in the context of developing nations, the purpose of this article is to 
consider a possible solution to profit shifting which occurs under the current transfer pricing 
regime, with that solution being unitary taxation with formulary apportionment.  It does so 
using the finance sector as a specific case for application.  Multinational financial institutions 
(MNFIs) play a significant role in financing activities of their clients in developing nations.  
Consistent with the ‘follow-the-client’ phenomenon which explains financial institution 
expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this 
growing market.  Further, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens but also, more 
than other industries, have opportunities to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures.  
This article establishes a case for an industry specific adoption of unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime.  It argues that such a 
model would benefit not only developed nations but also developing nations which are 
currently suffering the effects of BEPS.  In doing so, it considers the practicalities of such an 
implementation by examining both definitional issues and a possible formula for MNFIs.  
This article argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the 
current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how 
the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined as well as factors that 
should be included in an allocation formula, along with the appropriate weighting.  While it 
would be difficult for developing nations to adopt such a regime, it is argued that it would be 
no more difficult than addressing issues they face with the current transfer pricing regime.  
As such, this article concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable 
industry specific alternative for MNFIs which would assist developing nations and aid 
independent fiscal soundness.   
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1. Overview 
The OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project highlights many inadequacies of 
the current international tax system.  This system, designed a century ago, has not kept pace 
with the modern multinational entity rendering it, amongst other things, ineffective in taxing 
many modern businesses according to economic activity.  Consequently, there are difficulties 
associated with the application of the traditional international tax regime to traditional 
multinational entities and this is exacerbated when the same regime is applied to those sectors 
of multinational entities which are considered non-traditional businesses.  The consequence 
of tax base erosion is that it can adversely affect a nation’s ability to raise revenue necessary 
for its efficient running and, in the case of developing nations and emerging economies, 
significantly impede development.  Estimates of the effect of BEPS on developing nations are 
difficult to establish.  However, a Christian Aid report in 2008 estimated that if transfer 
pricing and the falsifying of invoices were addressed, developing nations would raise 
US$160bn a year in additional revenue.
1
  A further study on transfer pricing and developing 
countries, commissioned by the European Union and implemented by PwC, suggests that 
many developing nations currently ‘capture only 40% of their tax potential’.2   
The OECD, in its 15 point Action plan to deal with BEPS recognised that BEPS has a 
significant effect on developing nations because the lack of tax revenue can lead to a critical 
underfunding of public investment that would help promote economic growth.
3
  To this end, 
the BEPS project is aimed at ensuring an inclusive approach to take into account not only 
views of the G20 and OECD countries but also the perspective of developing nations.  
However, the BEPS Action Plan specifically states that ‘rather than seeking to replace the 
current transfer pricing system, the best course is to directly address flaws in the current 
system.’4  This article argues that possible reforms may also require a consideration of a 
move away from traditional developed nation/OECD models and practices to models which 
better reflect the reality of the modern global economy and the structure and form of 
multinational entities.  One such option is industry specific unitary taxation with formulary 
apportionment.  No doubt this would be considered a ‘bold’ move.  However, as argued in 
this article, it is a move which is feasible and may resolve many of the issues associated with 
the current transfer pricing regime which result in BEPS. 
One type of modern multinational business where the current international tax system is 
ineffective in taxing entities according to economic activity is the multinational financial 
institution (MNFI). The recent global financial crisis provides a particularly relevant and 
significant example of the failure of the current financial system on a global scale.  Further, 
because MNFIs are intermediaries which facilitate foreign investment, the activities of these 
multinational entities are continuing to impact the economies of developing nations and this 
is particularly evident in the context of taxation.  Unlike mining, tourism and manufacturing, 
the finance and banking industry is generally not considered to be a primary participant in the 
                                                 
1
 Christian Aid, ‘Death and Taxes: The True Toll of Tax Dodging’ May 2008 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/deathandtaxes.pdf  5. 
2
 European Commission ‘Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/transfer_pricing_dev_c
ountries.pdf  
3
 OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris, 2013) OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm,  
4
 OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris, 2013) OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm p20. 
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economic growth of developing nations and emerging economies.  However, its influence on, 
and the role it plays, in that growth cannot be underestimated.  As such, the modern MNFI 
provides an ideal industry to explore the possibility of industry specific unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment and the effect such a regime would have on developing nations. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.  Part two explains the significance of 
MNFIs for developing nations.  Longitudinal studies conducted by International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) researchers provide evidence of the rate of growth of MNFI presence in 
developing nations.  The IMF recently reported that from 1995-2009, foreign bank presence 
in developing countries grew by 122 per cent.
5
  The same study indicates that foreign banks 
have a 20 per cent market share in OECD countries and 50 per cent in emerging markets and 
developing countries.
6
  Hence, MNFIs are increasingly undertaking an intermediary role in 
developing economies where they are financing core business activities such as 
manufacturing, mining and tourism.  IMF analysis also suggests that in the future, foreign 
bank expansion will be greatest in emerging economies.  
Parts three and four of this article investigate whether a unitary taxation approach which 
reflects economic reality and is theoretically superior would, from a practical perspective, 
more easily and effectively ensure that the profits of MNFIs are taxed in the jurisdictions 
which give rise to those profits.  Specifically, it analyses the effects of a unitary taxation 
approach on the allocation of the profits of MNFIs to the developing nations in which the 
profits are earned.  In doing so, the article examines the practicalities of the implementation 
of unitary taxation for MNFIs in terms of the key components of such a regime, and their 
implications for developing countries.  The article adopts a two-step approach to considering 
the implications of unitary taxation as a means of improved corporate tax coordination which 
requires international acceptance and agreement.  First, part three considers the definitional 
issues of the unitary MNFI while part four investigates an appropriate allocation formula for 
this sector.   
Specifically, part three asks the question as to how the financial sector should be defined for 
the purposes of unitary taxation and what should constitute a unitary business for that sector.  
It is argued that it is appropriate to adopt a modern concept of nexus for the purposes of 
jurisdiction to tax, as well as a broad definition of ‘financial institution’ for the purposes of 
determining the application of the regime to a particular sector.  It also argues that a wide 
definition to the ‘unitary business’ should be adopted where a sector specific approach to 
unitary taxation is implemented, especially in a regime which is designed to ensure 
developing nations receive their ‘fair share’ of tax revenue.  It outlines the previous 
developed nation practice of applying a unitary taxation approach to the financial sector 
which has focused on a narrowly defined segment of the business of MNFIs and the 
integrated nature of 24-hour global trading.  This leads to the conclusion that particular 
aspects of the sector cannot and/or should not be separated from the more traditional aspects 
of the financial sector activities.  It is stressed that this is of particular importance for 
developing countries in which MNFIs typically would locate only retail and some aspects of 
wholesale financial services, but not their trading activities.  Adoption of a narrow definition 
of a unitary business for MNFIs would be likely to limit the potential advantages of unitary 
taxation generally and for developing countries specifically. 
                                                 
5
 Claessen, S. and Van Horen, N., ‘Foreign Banks: Trends, Impact and Financial Stability’ (2012) International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/12/10, 3. 
6
 Ibid. 
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Part four considers what would be a ‘best practice’ model of an allocation formula for the 
purposes of the apportionment of the profits of the unitary business of a financial institution.  
Recommendations are based on available data from existing domestic unitary tax regimes, 
proposed regimes and current practices in relation to advance pricing agreements for global 
trading.  A theoretical analysis of a formula for this particular sector of multinational entities 
is considered in order to investigate the effect of the different variations of the predominant 
three-factor formula of assets-labour-sales.  This part of the article specifically considers the 
effect of adopting such a formula on the allocation of profits both in terms of the differences 
between the current and recommended model and the effect on developing nations.   
The article concludes that MNFIs, through their intermediary role of facilitating finance to 
core industries, play a significant role in the economic advancement of developing nations.  
As such, it needs to be ensured that the institutions themselves as taxpayers are being taxed 
fairly and equitably in accordance with the location of the economic substance of their 
activities giving rise to profits.  The economic substance of the activities of MNFIs operating 
in developing nations is located in those jurisdictions, that is, the MNFIs are earning profits 
based on their transactions with clients operating in the developing nations.  As such, unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment provides a viable industry specific solution to a fair 
and equitable allocation of those profits and proposes that a two-factor equally weighted 
formula of sales and compensation is likely to be the most appropriate formula to apply.  This 
article also suggests that agreement is possible as to the definitional and practical 
implementation issues.  There is already evidence that the current jurisdiction and allocation 
rules do not work for MNFIs and that there are existing practices that can provide guidance as 
to an acceptable formulary apportionment model for MNFIs.  As such, acceptance of this 
model as superior for the specific industry of MNFIs may not be as onerous as its acceptance 
for multinational entities generally. 
 
2. The Significance of MNFIs for Developing Nations 
The modern MNFI is increasingly undertaking more globalised and complex trading 
operations and is one of the most highly integrated classes of multinational entities.
7
  A 
primary reason for the globalisation of financial institutions is that they typically ‘follow-the-
customer’ into jurisdictions where international capital and international investors are 
required.  Currently, global growth is being experienced in developing nations, hence MNFIs 
are following their customers into those same countries.  Additionally, the attractiveness of 
profit opportunities in the host nation, no or low barriers to entry and the presence of 
mechanisms to mitigate information costs of doing business in a foreign market have also 
been suggested as reasons for bank expansion into developing nations.
8
  The global 
expansion of domestic banks has resulted in jurisdictions addressing the increase in 
multinational financial institutions by amending regulatory control measures, despite the 
financial sector being at ‘the cutting edge of globalisation with very significant grown in 
                                                 
7
 For a discussion on the unique nature of MNFIs and the difficulties associated with taxing this sector under the 
traditional international tax regime, see Benshalom, I., ‘The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global 
Economy: Emerging to an Allocation Phase’ (2008) 28 Virginia Tax Review, 165. 
8
 Cull, R. and Soledad Martinez Peria, M., ‘Foreign Bank Participation in Developing Countries - What Do We 
Know about the Drivers and Consequences of This Phenomenon?’ (2010) The World Bank, Development 
Research Group, Finance and Private Sector Development Team, August 2010. 
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cross border financial positions in recent decades’,9 very little has been done in the tax 
context.   
Historically, there were relatively few MNFIs in existence and, as such, international tax 
issues associated with the industry were not considered significant.
10
  However, since 1984, 
the year that the OECD specifically addressed some of the substantive transfer pricing issues 
relating to multinational banks, there has been continued and increasing concern about the 
equitable distribution of the taxing rights to the profits earned.
11
  The recent shift by MNFIs 
toward developing nations as host countries means that it is timely to consider the role these 
institutions play in contributing their ‘fair share’ of tax revenue to those nations where the 
activities of the financial institutions are giving rise to the profits.  Put succinctly, ‘clearly, 
there is much at stake – for developing, emerging and developed countries alike – in seeking 
to get the taxation of the financial sector right.’12 
The role that MNFIs play in the global economy and national tax systems by facilitating 
foreign investment is widely recognised, as is their role in facilitating and/or promoting 
aggressive tax planning techniques.
13
  It is also recognised that MNFIs not only have clients 
which use complex structured finance transactions
14
 to benefit from tax arrangements, but 
may also receive tax benefits themselves from such transactions and structures.
15
  As Carter 
states ‘[t]he development of the financial sector is a crucial part of the growth process in 
developing countries since it has major implications for the effectiveness of capital allocation 
across the rest of the economy and the ease with which the government or central bank can 
implement monetary policy operations. The centrality of these functions has long lent the 
sector special importance.’16 
Previous industry specific studies into the effects of aggressive tax planning on developing 
nations, along with recommendations for reform, have focused on traditional multinational 
activities such as manufacturing, with other traditional industries such as mining and tourism 
                                                 
9
 Carter, A, (ed) “International Tax Dialogie: Key issues and debates in VAT, SME taxation and the treatment of 
the financial sector” International Tax Dialogue, www.itdweb.org, 2013, 103. 
10
 The increase in global trading is driven by the global demand created by the clients of banks, both borrowers 
and investors.  In particular, the global market established by traditional multinational entities created a 
demand for the innovative financial instruments subsequently developed by multinational banks: John 
Neighbour, ‘Innovative Financial Instruments Challenge the Global Tax System’ (1997) 14 Tax Notes 
International 931, 931.  An explosive growth of these innovative financial instruments has occurred over the 
last four decades: see for example, Jeffrey M Colon, ‘Financial Products and Source Based Taxation: U.S. 
International Tax Policy at the Crossroads’ (1999) University of Illinois Law Review 775, 777. 
11
 This is most notable in the various OECD reports.  See, for example, OECD (1984) Transfer Pricing and 
Multinational Entities – Three Taxation Issues; OECD (1998) The Taxation of Global Trading of Financial 
Instruments; OECD (2010) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments. 
12
 Carter, A, (ed) “International Tax Dialogie: Key issues and debates in VAT, SME taxation and the treatment 
of the financial sector” International Tax Dialogue, www.itdweb.org, 2013, 101. 
13
 OECD, Building Transparent Tax Compliance by Banks, 2009. 
14
 The acronym CSFT is used by the OECD in its report on such transactions: OECD, building Transparent Tax 
Compliance by banks, 2009. 
15
 The OECD in its report on Building Transparent Tax Compliance by Banks states: ‘The majority of banks 
who provide standard banking services will include CSFTs as part of their suite of products. However the 
degree of involvement can vary, from only providing payment processing for the transaction, to executing a 
part of the transaction, through to structuring and marketing the transaction as well as being a party to the 
CSFT and enjoying any tax benefits themselves’: OECD, Building Transparent Tax Compliance by Banks, 
2009, 22. 
16
 Carter, A, (ed) “International Tax Dialogue: Key issues and debates in VAT, SME taxation and the treatment 
of the financial sector” International Tax Dialogue, www.itdweb.org, 2013, 99. 
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also considered worthy of focus.  However, to fund these traditional ventures, financial 
institutions are often brought into play and to that extent we have seen an unprecedented 
degree of globalisation in the finance sector with a dramatic increase in cross-border capital 
flows.
17
  The increased participation by foreign banks into developing nations is very much a 
phenomenon of the 1990s.
18
  The significance of the expansion of MNFIs has been 
recognised by IMF researchers.  Building on its existing research into foreign bank trends, in 
a January 2012 report, the IMF found that the globalisation of the finance industry not only 
involves banks from developing countries expanding into developing nations but also banks 
from developing nations establishing a presence in other jurisdictions.
19
  The findings of the 
IMF study which are particularly relevant to this article are: 
 
 between 1995-2009, foreign bank presence in OECD and high-income countries grew 
by approximately 40 percent, in emerging markets the number of foreign banks grew 
by 72 percent and in developing countries the number grew by 122 percent;
20
  
 during the same period foreign bank presence shifted away from OECD countries 
towards developing counties, explained by more open financial markets and improved 
prospects in the developing nations;
21
 
 in terms of loans, deposits and profits, foreign banks have an average 20 percent 
market share in OECD countries, close to 45 percent in emerging markets and close to 
50 percent in emerging markets and developing countries;
22
 
 in countries with over 50 percent foreign bank presence, foreign banks play an 
important part in financial intermediation and engage less in traditional lending;
23
 and 
 banks are responding to the economic slowdown in advanced countries and the 
increased economic importance of emerging markets with growth opportunities and 
profit margins likely to be higher in those markets;
24
 
Studies into MNFI entry into developing nations as host nations are increasing in line with 
the recognition of their significance.  To date, studies have focused on both the effect of 
foreign bank entry into developing nations along with their broader role in economic 
development.  Recent studies conclude that foreign banks entering developing nations have a 
positive effect on bank performance
25
 by increasing efficiency and competition.
26
  These 
institutions arguably provide much needed capital, introduce innovative financial products 
and contribute technical skills to developing nations.  However, more broadly, questions 
                                                 
17
 Claessen, S. and Van Horen, N., ‘Foreign Banks: Trends, Impact and Financial Stability’ (2012) International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/12/10, 3. 
18
 Cull, R. and Soledad Martinez Peria, M., ‘Foreign Bank Participation in Developing Countries - What Do We 
Know about the Drivers and Consequences of This Phenomenon?’ (2010) The World Bank, Development 
Research Group, Finance and Private Sector Development Team, August 2010. 
19
 Claessen, S. and Van Horen, N., ‘Foreign Banks: Trends, Impact and Financial Stability’ (2012) International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/12/10, 3. 
20
 Ibid, 1. 
21
 Ibid, 10. 
22
 Ibid, 14. 
23
 Ibid, 5. 
24
 Ibid, 20. 
25
 Čihák, M. and Podpiera, R., ‘Bank Behavior in Developing Countries: Evidence from East Africa’ (2005) 
IMF working paper WP/05/129. 
26
 Cull, R. and Soledad Martinez Peria, M., ‘Foreign Bank Participation in Developing Countries - What Do We 
Know about the Drivers and Consequences of This Phenomenon?’ (2010) The World Bank, Development 
Research Group, Finance and Private Sector Development Team, August 2010. 
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remain around the contributions made by MNFIs to sustainable economic development
27
 with 
studies finding that they tend to be much more passive than local banks and, at least in 
nations such as Zimbabwe, fail to make any significant contribution to economic 
development.
28
  While these studies do not extend to the tax arrangements entered into by 
MNFIs themselves, ActionAid recently released its report entitled ‘Time to Clean Up: How 
Barclays Promotes the Use of Tax Havens in Africa.’29 calling for Barclays bank to ‘ensure it 
makes the maximum contribution towards sustainable and equitable growth’.30 The focus of 
the ActionAid report is the role that Barclays plays in facilitating aggressive tax planning and 
promoting the use of tax havens by businesses investing in Africa,
31
  pointing out that this is a 
failure by Barclays to support responsible investment and sustainable development for all.
32
  
The ActionAid report also gleans insight into the activities of Barclays as a taxpayer, 
revealing the following which are particularly relevant to this article: 
 UK banks are the most prolific users of tax havens amongst listed UK companies with 
five banks in the FTSE 100 having 1780 subsidiaries in tax havens;
33
 
 Barclays, reported to be the largest retail bank in Africa, and the largest UK bank 
operating on the continent, is one of the most persistent users of tax havens with 471 
subsidiaries listed in tax havens in 2012;
34
 and 
 Barclays has a significant presence in Mauritius. 
Not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens, but previous studies have also 
demonstrated that MNFIs are shifting profits through transfer pricing.  It is believed that 
multinational banks have, even more than other multinational entities, opportunities for 
reducing their tax burdens in high-tax countries by way of intra-firm transfer pricing.
35
  In 
their study of multinational banks Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga found that taxes paid by 
foreign banks were relatively low in many of the major industrialised nations.  By examining 
the relationship between the taxes paid and the statutory tax rate, they obtained further 
support for their profit shifting hypothesis.  Their study showed a negative relationship 
between taxes paid and the statutory tax rate suggesting the presence of profit shifting.
36
  As 
additional support for the profit shifting premise Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, controlling 
for bank characteristics, found that foreign banks paid lower taxes in several developed 
countries.  Further, on a cross-country basis, they found that taxes paid by foreign banks fall 
with the statutory tax as additional evidence of profit shifting by foreign banks.
37
  While this 
                                                 
27
 See, for example, Mabvure, T., Kamoyo, M., Ndlovu, B., Gwangwava E. and Manuere, F., ‘Multinational 
Banks’ Role in Zimbabwe’s Economic Development’ (2012) 14(7) Journal of Sustainable Development in 
Africa. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 ActionAid, Time to Clean Up: How Barclays Promotes the Use of Tax Havens in Africa, available at 
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/barclays_report_final.pdf  
30
 Ibid, 4. 
31
 ActionAid cites the examples of Barclays Offshore Corporate division as well as its operations in Mauritius.  
32
 ActionAid, Time to Clean Up: How Barclays Promotes the Use of Tax Havens in Africa, available at 
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/barclays_report_final.pdf, 2. 
33
 ActionAid cites its research found at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/tax-justice/ftse-100-tax-haven-tracker-the-
new-data to support these figures. 
34
 Ibid. 
35 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H., ‘The Taxation of Domestic and Foreign Banking’ (2001) 79 Journal of 
Public Economics 429, 430. 
36 
Ibid.  Their estimates suggested that the relationship between the taxes paid and the statutory tax rate was 
positive for domestic banks, but negative for foreign banks.  This was interpreted as profit shifting by 
foreign banks. 
37 
Ibid, 449. 
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study focuses on developed nations it is reasonable to expect that the same techniques are 
being used to shift profits from developing nations. 
It has previously been argued that there are fundamental differences between multinational 
entities generally and MNFIs specifically which make it particularly difficult to apply 
traditional source and transfer pricing rules to arrive at a fair allocation of profits to the 
relevant jurisdictions for the purposes of taxation.
38
  The same research also concludes that 
unitary taxation is, at least theoretically, a viable alternative to the tax current regime.  
However, extending on from this research is the need to demonstrate that formulary 
apportionment is a practical alternative.  While it can be demonstrated that unitary taxation 
with formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior model for taxing MNFIs, the 
practical difficulties associated with its implementation are not insignificant.  In particular, 
consensus as to the tax base, the composition of the formula and the definition of the factors 
and the scope of the unitary business would be needed.  Such agreement would not be 
reached without conflict especially when the concerns of both developed and developing 
nations are taken into account.  As such, the remainder of the article considers two key 
components to the regime which would need to be determined were an industry specific 
approach adopted: the unitary business of the MNFI and a suitable formula for MNFIs.  The 
issues relating to these components are raised with a view to disclosing the pertinent 
questions that need to be dealt with at a practical level before implementation of unitary 
taxation based on formulary apportionment would be possible for MNFIs.  Parts three and 
four do however adopt the approach that unitary taxation based on formulary apportionment 
is demonstrated to be a superior model to the current allocation rules for MNFIs and, as such, 
does not continue to draw a distinction between the current source and residency rules of the 
existing international tax model as contrasted with a proposed unitary taxation with formulary 
apportionment model, but rather focuses on the tensions within a unitary tax model.   
 
3. Defining the Unitary Business of the Multinational Financial Institution 
Part three of this article explores the definition of a unitary business and unitary business 
activities for MNFIs and, within the context of current structures adopted in the financial 
sector, recommends an appropriate approach to defining a unitary business for MNFIs which 
ensures that a formulary apportionment regime would accurately reflect the economic 
substance of the business when operating in developing nations.  The practical 
implementation issues evidenced from this research are contextualised for the financial sector 
and analysed within a theoretical framework which supports a wide definition of the unitary 
business.  Specifically, this part of the article argues that it is appropriate to adopt a wide 
definition of unitary business where there are developed and developing nations involved in 
the process and a sector specific approach to unitary taxation is implemented.  For example, 
previous practice applying a unitary taxation approach to the financial sector in a developed 
                                                 
38
 See, for example, Sadiq, K., ‘Taxation of multinational banks: using formulary apportionment to reflect 
economic reality: 1’ (2011) 22(5) Journal of International Taxation, 46; Sadiq, K., ‘Taxation of 
multinational banks: using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality: Part 2’ (2012) 23(2) Journal 
of International Taxation, 54; Sadiq, K., ‘The taxation of multinational banks: alternative apportionment 
through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality’ (2007) 13(4) New Zealand Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy, 640; Sadiq, K., The taxation of multinational banking income: is the traditional 
rationale correct?’ (2008) 19(4) Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice, 229. The summary 
contained in Part 2.4 of the current article is based on this prior work of the author.   
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nation setting has focused on the integrated nature of 24-hour global trading.  This leads to 
the need to address issues such as whether this particular aspect of the sector could or should 
be separated from the more traditional aspects of the financial sector.  This is of particular 
importance for developing countries in which MNFIs typically would locate only retail and 
some aspects of wholesale financial services, but not their trading activities.  It is argued that 
the adoption of a narrow definition of a unitary business for MNFIs would be likely to limit 
the potential advantages of unitary taxation for developing countries. 
Broadly, a unitary business should include the operations and activities of the commonly 
controlled entities, no matter what the structure, that contribute to an overall business 
enterprise.  However, it is necessary to consider both (1) the definition of a MNFI, that is, 
which multinational entities would fall within the scope of such an industry specific 
application both in terms of being multinational and a financial institution and (2) the scope 
of what would be considered the unitary business of a MNFI.  As such, part three is divided 
into three sections.  Section one considers what is meant by a financial institution which is 
‘multinational’ and discusses the issue of ‘nexus’ in the context of jurisdiction to tax.  Section 
two describes what is generally considered to fall within the scope of the MNFI and discusses 
the various component of the market sector.  Section three then goes on to consider the 
‘unitary business’ of a MNFI by considering which activities of the MNFI should be included 
both in the context of the different parts of the entity and the different activities undertaken.  
It does so before considering the apportionment formula as it is necessary to determine what 
constitutes the unitary business group and the income to which the formula will be applied as 
a precursor to any apportionment.   
 
3.1 THE TAXABLE CONNECTION TO A MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION  
An industry specific adoption of unitary taxation inherently requires that the target industry is 
defined.  So far, this article has discussed the multinational entity sector of financial 
institutions as an obvious candidate for an industry specific approach but has yet to define 
what is meant by a MNFI as well as the scope of that sector.  Further, it must also be 
remembered that the purpose of taxing multinational entities, and particularly MNFIs, under a 
unitary taxation model with formulary apportionment is to ensure that all jurisdictions receive 
their ‘fair share’ of tax revenue according to the economic activity undertaken.  In order for 
jurisdictions to have the right to tax a necessary nexus must be established.  The current 
international tax regime generally adopts the ‘permanent establishment’ concept to establish a 
taxable connection.  Such an approach is consistent with traditional multinational entities but 
may need to be reconsidered for MNFIs as its usefulness as a criterion for being subject to tax 
under a formulary apportionment regime is questionable,
39
 and this becomes particularly 
evident in relation to developing nations.  In particular, the use of the traditional permanent 
establishment criteria may mean that developing nations are not able to establish a nexus in 
relation to the income of MNFIs.  The discussion below demonstrates why. 
Traditionally, multinational entities were thought to be providers of goods rather than 
services.  This is an assumption that arguably legislators have also made.  However, such an 
assumption is incorrect.  More recently, as noted by Williams, multinational entities have 
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been more widely defined as ‘an enterprise that owns and controls activities in different 
countries.’40  This definition is broader because it extends beyond physical ownership in 
another country to control over activities and may be much closer to what we consider to be a 
multinational entity today.  However, in the context of the MNFI there is lack of agreement 
as to when we have international banking as contrasted with multinational banking because, 
if we consider what is meant by a multinational bank, as Williams points out ‘developments 
in the institutional and technological features of multinational banking have resulted in banks 
owning and controlling banking activities in one country from geographical locations 
removed from the assumed location of that activity.’41  However, a narrow definition of the 
multinational entity, and one that requires physical presence could be restrictive in terms of 
the institutions which are caught within the scope of the MNFI and especially detrimental for 
developing nations.  That is because physical presence is not required for there to be 
multinational activity as activities may result in transactions involving foreign jurisdictions 
without the bank leaving its home country.  A narrow definition which requires physical 
presence does not capture such activities and would therefore also fail to satisfy a taxable 
connection.  As such, from a MNFI perspective, to ensure an accurate definition is adopted, it 
may be necessary to ensure that a broader definition of the multinational enterprise is 
accepted to include not only a physical presence but also extend to the control of activities in 
different jurisdictions to ensure that it is economic presence which is captured.   This 
approach is consistent with the discussion below which argues that jurisdiction to tax should 
be based on a broad business presence test rather than a physical presence.   
An analysis of current formulary apportionment models suggests that physical presence 
through a permanent establishment is the most common way to confirm a taxable connection.  
Certainly, this is the criteria adopted in many of the existing domestic formulary 
apportionment regime.  However, it needs to be remembered that these existing regimes are 
being applied in developed nations and across similar economies.  A global system which 
incorporates both developed and developing nations needs to ensure that a nexus test 
accurately captures the ‘presence’ in a jurisdiction.  To this extent, in the US there have been 
cases where the courts have found that ‘significant economic presence’ is a better indicator of 
nexus.
42 
 Depending on the factors contained in the formula, an approach which relies on the 
traditional concept of the permanent establishment to establish nexus can lead to income 
being allocated to a jurisdiction with insufficient taxable connection.  It is demonstrated 
below that this is certainly possible where a sales factor based on destination is included in 
the formula.  As such, a different taxing nexus or taxable connection, such as sales into a 
jurisdiction rather than residence or its proxy of a permanent establishment would better align 
with economic substance and provide a taxing nexus where MNFIs are conducting business 
consistent with a formulary apportionment approach.
43
  For developing nations, this would 
ensure that sales into their jurisdictions, for example loans, which fund primary activities 
such as mining and tourism, are allocated to that developing nation. 
                                                 
40
 Williams, B., ‘Positive Theories of Multinational Banking: Eclectic Theory Versus Internalisation Theory’ 
(1997) (11) 1 Journal of Economic Surveys, 72, citing Buckley and Casson (1991) The Future of the 
Multinational Enterprise, 2
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 Edition (MacMillan 1991) 33.  
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 Ibid, 72. 
42
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Berger, C., ‘Nexus and the Need for Clarification: The Rise of Economic and Attributional Nexus’ (2008) 26 
Journal of State Taxation 29.  See also: Grob, S. and Roberts, W., 'The Michigan Business Tax: In Lieu of 
Taxes Applicable to Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies' (2007) 53 The Wayne Law Review 
1499. 
43
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3.2 THE SCOPE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
Where a separate regime for taxing a specific industry is proposed, it is clearly necessary to 
define the scope of that industry of market sector.  In this particular case, it would be 
necessary to define what is meant by the MNFI.  The most obvious MNFI is the multinational 
bank, with multinational banking alone encompassing a wide variety of activities such as 
currency trading, participation in the Euromarket, borrowing and lending, and the financing 
of international trade.  The MNFI sector also includes other obvious examples such as 
insurance companies, mortgage companies, investment and pension funds, stock brokerages 
and investment advisory services,
44
 but that list is not complete.  There is no doubt that 
international financing is undergoing continual growth and change
45
 which means that it is 
impossible to predict the types of financial activities that will be undertaken, and entities that 
will undertake them, in the future and, as such, a broad principles-based approach over a 
prescriptive approach may be the most appropriate.  Williams attributes these continual 
changes to factors such as deregulation of domestic financial systems, product innovation and 
increased participation by non-traditional providers of financial services.
46
 While 
multinational banks, with the provision of banking services, are still major participants in the 
MNFI sector, financial services are increasingly being supplied by a broader category of 
financial institutions as well as non-traditional providers.  As such, to ensure that all 
providers whose business is that of predominantly providing financial services are subject to 
the same international tax regime, it would be necessary to define a MNFI more widely than 
the multinational bank.  Failure to do so would undoubtedly fail to capture some of the riskier 
and more innovative financial providers and arrangements.  While it is arguable that the types 
of activities being undertaken in developing nations are the more traditional ones, any regime 
needs to factor in the globalisation and innovation of the financial market and the possibilities 
of products and services which have not even been thought of today.  To this extent, various 
existing legislative definitions may assist.  By way of example, Appendix 1 lists various 
legislative definitions and their source. 
3.3 THE UNITARY BUSINESS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
Once it is determined that a multinational entity falls within the particular market sector of 
the financial institution, it becomes necessary to define the unitary business.  That is, which 
parts of the business of the financial institution are considered part of the MNFI for unitary 
taxation purposes?  This requires a consideration of not only a determination of the scope of 
the corporate group, in other words, which parts of the MNFI are to be included in the unitary 
business (the scope of the group), but also which activities of the MNFI are to be subject to 
unitary taxation with formulary apportionment (the scope of the business activities).  At the 
outset, it should be recognised that the adoption of a narrow definition of a unitary business 
for MNFIs would be likely to limit the potential advantages of unitary taxation for developing 
countries.  As such, this article argues for a wide definition of both the scope of the unitary 
business and the unitary business activities while at the same time recognising that from a 
practical perspective this is a more difficult approach to adopt. 
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3.3.1  The Scope of the Unitary MNFI Group 
An important element of a unitary tax model is the taxable unit.  That is, what is included in 
the unitary group, and this can be a single entity, a consolidated corporate group or a unitary 
combined group.
47
  Normally, a unitary business is understood to be ‘a business that has 
common control, common management, integrated operations, and, in general, a flow of 
value among the related entities.’48  While the various approaches adopted in domestic 
regimes is briefly discussed below in the context of the apportionment formulas, this part of 
the article deals specifically with the structure of the MNFI.  Where a financial institution is 
multinational, its organisational structure may take on several different forms.  Organisational 
structure relates to both legal structure as well as allocational structure.  Allocational structure 
relates to the way in which the organisation allocates the duties and responsibilities as well as 
lines of authority and this may be done based on geographic, functional or divisional lines.   
The allocational structure issues will arise in relation to the application of a formula for 
allocation purposes while the legal structure will relate to the unitary group.  Where a MNFI 
establishes a presence in a host nation, it has several options in terms of legal organisational 
structure, with host nation regulations often contributing to the decision as to optimal 
structure.   
Williams (2002) provides a list of eight legal organisational structures as described in the 
following table.
49
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LEGAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES 
Correspondent Banking 
Correspondent banks act to clear transactions between banks. The domestic bank appoints a 
foreign bank to act as its agent for transactions in that foreign country.  
Representative Offices 
A representative office is a small office in the host nation that coordinates a bank's 
correspondent banking relationships and renders assistance to the bank’s existing customers. 
The office often has a secondary role of disseminating information about the parent bank and 
collecting information about the host country.  
Agencies 
Agencies conduct transactions. The activities permitted to agencies vary according to host 
country laws, with some nations prohibiting agency activity by multinational banks.  These 
agencies cannot normally raise or solicit deposits.  
Consortium Banks 
A consortium bank can be considered as a joint venture bank separately incorporated and 
owned by two or more shareholders who are themselves banks, usually of different 
nationalities. Some consortium banks are formed to service a particular market segment or to 
access a particular geographic market. 
Merchant Bank Subsidiaries 
A merchant bank subsidiary is a merchant (investment) bank that is wholly owned by a bank 
located in another country. It is a subsidiary that offers the full range of wholesale services 
without the constraints that may be imposed on a full banking entry.  
Edge Act Corporations 
Edge Act Corporations are an organizational structure unique to the United States. Edge Act 
corporations can conduct a wide range of banking activities including financing international 
trade. 
Bank Branches 
A foreign bank branch is a branch located in a different country from the country of 
incorporation of the parent bank, without the branch itself having separate incorporation.  It 
carries on banking business, subject to the laws of the host nation.  
Bank Subsidiaries 
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A bank subsidiary is a separately incorporated bank that is controlled by a parent located in 
another country. Multinational banks generally prefer the branch structure to the subsidiary 
structure, however in some cases the host nation regulator will not permit foreign bank 
branches to be established. 
 
An examination of the legal organisational structures reveals three broad categories: branch, 
subsidiary and agent.  In relation to banks entering developing nations, Cetrutti, et al. found 
that the presence of banks in middle income and developing countries ‘has taken a variety of 
forms, ranging from the acquisition of domestic institutions with extensive branch networks 
to the establishment of isolated representative offices aimed at serving niche market 
segments.’50  Further, they conclude from their study that ‘banks are more likely to operate as 
branches in countries that have higher taxes and lower regulatory restrictions on bank entry 
and on foreign branches.  Subsidiary operations are preferred by banks seeking to penetrate 
host markets by establishing large retail operations.’51  As such, each of the different 
structures should ideally be captured to encompass the unitary business. 
The US approach to what constitutes a unitary business may provide some guidance as to 
how the unitary business of the MNFI should be defined, as could the proposed EU CCCTB 
model, although case law demonstrates that this is by no means a settled matter and the 
question may be one of fact and circumstance.  Arguably, there will be no one correct 
definition of what falls within the scope of the unitary business of a MNFI and ultimately 
what will be important is political agreement.  It will usually be obvious that a branch is part 
of the unitary business of finance as they will fall within the current concept of the permanent 
establishment, both in terms of the traditional international tax regime and also any of the 
domestic formulary apportionment regimes.  Often, MNFIs will be operating as branches in 
developing nations and, as such, those nations will also be entitled to an allocation of the 
profits.  However, what may not be so obvious is when the other legal structures fall within 
the scope of the unitary business of the MNFI.   
Two approaches have developed to determine whether separately incorporated affiliates are 
part of the unitary group: legal unity and economic unity.  The first defines the unitary 
business by reference to legal control whereas the second defines the unitary group by 
reference to common economic activities.  Any global approach would need to deal with this 
issue if it were to ensure that both developed and developing nations are accurately allocated 
profits under a formulary apportionment approach.  Both approaches are not without 
problems, the most obvious being that the legal approach is open to manipulation, while the 
economic integration approach leads to uncertainty and practical difficulties in its application.   
The proposed EU CCCTB model suggests the following test: 
Eligibility for consolidation (group membership) should be determined in 
accordance with a two-part test based on (i) control (more than 50% of voting 
rights) and (ii) ownership (more than 75% of equity) or rights to profits (more 
than 75% of rights giving entitlement to profit). Such a test ensures a high 
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level of economic integration between group members, as indicated by a 
relation of control and a high level of participation. The two thresholds should 
be met throughout the tax year; otherwise, the company should leave the 
group immediately. There should also be a nine-month minimum requirement 
for group membership.
52
 
Such an approach for MNFIs may mean that much of the activity described in the table above 
may fall outside the scope of the unitary MNFI business which could provide opportunities 
for aggressive tax planning. As such, MNFIs may still be able to channel profits away from 
developing nations in which economic activity is occurring but ensuring that a subsidiary is 
not part of the unitary business.  From a MNFI perspective, a dependent agent provision, in 
line with the traditional permanent establishment definition, would certainly widen much of 
what is caught.  However it may still not incorporate all activities.   
Even where the unitary group is determined, there is a second question that needs to be 
addressed and that relates to the activities which fall within the scope of the unitary business 
for the purposes of applying the formula. 
3.3.2 The Scope of the Unitary Business Activities 
One the one hand, it is argued that ‘apportionment formulas used should, to the extent 
practically possible, be applied to all of the taxpayer’s consolidated income, from all sources, 
without attempting to distinguish between business and non-business income, and without 
seeking to divide taxpayers’ incomes among different unitary activities.’53  On the other 
hand, it is generally accepted that it is neither necessary nor desirable to include all of the 
activities of the multinational entity within the scope of the unitary business if they do not 
engage in related activities.
54
  As Picciotto points out, such an approach might in fact enable 
tax avoidance through the acquisition of an unrelated business which facilitates profit shifting 
and/or profit dilution.
55
  These points should be considered as two separate issues; first, 
whether the income should include both business and non-business income, and second, 
whether the income should be subject to the formulary apportionment regime on an activity-
by-activity basis. 
Business and Non-Business Income 
The approach in the US has been to distinguish between business and non-business income.  
However, as Durst points out, this is far from ideal.
56
  For the purposes of this article, the 
problems would be especially obvious where the multinational in question is a MNFI.  It has 
historically been difficult to distinguish between business and non-business income, with 
different jurisdictions having different rules for doing so, and quite often, a continued degree 
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of uncertainty as to the distinction.  This would be exacerbated in the finance industry given 
the highly complex structures and transactions entered into.  As such, allowing MNFIs to 
distinguish between business and non-business income would most likely lead to aggressive 
tax planning practices with developed and developing nations alike missing out. The ability 
to reclassify business income into passive income would likely be easily achieved by MNFIs. 
Combined Income versus Activity-by-Activity Approach 
The application of formulary apportionment to MNFIs would require a decision on whether 
the formula is to be applied to the global income of the MNFI (with the obvious difficulties 
of adjusting that income to reflect taxable income) or the combined income of certain 
activities of the MNFI, known as the activity-by-activity approach.
57
  Currently, we have the 
example of a type of formulary apportionment applying to global trading in Notice 94-40 
discussed below which is an illustration of the latter.  MNFIs are an example of an industry 
where the activity-by-activity approach would be relatively easy to implement compared to 
the combined income approach.  Most MNFIs have relatively delineated retail, commercial 
and investment banking activities, along with separate global trading activities. However, if 
we take global trading as an example, it is demonstrated that the activities caught are very 
limited.  Global dealing, or global trading, operations are generally narrowly defined to only 
include ‘the execution of customer transactions (including marketing, sales, pricing and risk 
management activities) in a particular financial product or line of financial products, in 
multiple tax jurisdictions and/or through multiple participants.’58 This means that activities 
such as lending are not included within the definition of a global dealing operation. As such, 
a combined income approach is one which more accurately captures all of the activities of a 
MNFI globally and is much more likely to capture activities being undertaken which relate to 
economic activity in developing nations.  Further, and also in the context of developing 
nations, an activity-by-activity approach may do little in the way of allocating income 
according to the location of the economic activity if formulary apportionment was only 
applied to those parts of the MNFI where the arm’s length approach is difficult to apply. 
 
4. The Apportionment Formula 
The apportionment formula is perhaps the most important, but also the most difficult and 
therefore most controversial element of a unitary tax model.  Such a process will be 
exacerbated at a global level, specifically where there are countries with differing imperatives 
such as those between developed and developing nations.  The two elements to the formula 
are first, the factors of the formula and second, the weighting of those factors.  From a 
pragmatic perspective, under a proposed unitary tax model for MNFIs, it is via the formula 
that the international income of those entities is ultimately divided.  As such, part four of this 
article investigates an appropriate formula for MNFIs to ensure that profits are allocated 
according to economic activity for not only developed, but also developing nations.  Part four 
is divided into three sections with section one examining current formulary apportionment 
models based on available data from existing domestic unitary tax regimes and international 
tax authority negotiations (for example, advance pricing agreements).  Section two looks at 
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the broad definitions and problems associated with the three factors that are common to the 
models examined.  Section three then considers a theoretical analysis of an industry specific 
formula for unitary taxation of MNFIs.  This section investigates the effect of the different 
variations of the predominant three-factor formula of assets-labour-sales. In doing so, this 
section of the article will specifically consider the effect of adopting such a formula on the 
allocation of profits both in terms of the differences between the current and recommended 
model and the effect on developing countries.  Prior to embarking on a discussion of 
alternative approaches to the formula, it should be noted that formulary apportionment does 
not necessarily require unitary taxation.  A formula can simply be applied to the income of 
the legal entity over which a jurisdiction has the right to tax.  However, this article adopts the 
view that the discussion on formulary apportionment is based on a unitary tax system as a 
superior model. 
 
4.1 CURRENT FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT MODELS 
Formulary apportionment regimes are not new and there are several working examples which 
have been around for more than half a century that can be considered to evaluate the various 
factors to be incorporated into a formula, along with appropriate weightings.  Currently, the 
United States, Canada and Switzerland all have effective formulary apportionment regimes in 
place at a sub-national level.  Germany also uses a form of formulary apportionment in 
relation to its trade tax.  Further, the European Union has a proposed model and, more 
specifically, in relation to MNFIs, there is industry specific guidance for the adoption of a 
formulary apportionment model when entering into a global trading advance pricing 
agreement (APA).  While the United States model is the most discussed and analysed system, 
to avoid any bias, this article considers the existing systems in alphabetical order, followed by 
the proposed European Union system and then the industry specific APA guidance.   
At the outset of a consideration of possible apportionment models it needs to be recognised 
that all of these models are designed to operate within either a domestic or regional setting.  
Further, each of the allocation regimes then attribute profits (or taxes) amongst a relatively 
homogenous and sophisticated group of taxing authorities.  As such, these models can merely 
provide guidance to developed countries but the considerations of developing countries also 
need to be factored in.  These are considered throughout the discussion in part 4.2 of this 
article.  
 
4.1.1 The Canadian System 
Canada has a system of provincial and territorial corporation tax which, except for Quebec 
and Alberta, is administered by the Canada Revenue Agency at federal level.  Under the 
Canadian system a taxpayer who carries on business in more than one province or territory 
uses a formula to determine the provincial income allocation.
59
  This system is known as 
‘formulary allocation’ and applies where a taxpayer has a permanent establishment60 in more 
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than one province or territory.  Jurisdiction to tax is based on the ‘permanent establishment’ 
nexus.  Legislative details of the regime are contained in Part IV of the Canadian Income Tax 
Regulations
61
  Under the regulations, a common formula is applied by the Federal 
government to a common tax base and then a provincial specific tax rate is applied. The 
taxable unit is the single entity and not a consolidated corporate group or unitary combined 
group.
62
   
As a general rule, Canada applies a two-factor formula of sales and payroll with each 
weighted equally.
63 
 Canada rejected the one factor sales formula on the basis that it gave 
too much weight to the location of the head office, while the three-factor formula of the US 
was rejected on the basis that it favoured exporting provinces and the property factor was 
difficult to administer.
64
   
The Canadian Regulations also provide for nine industry specific formulas, all of which 
maintain two factors.  These industries are: insurance corporations, banks, trust and loan 
corporations, railway corporations, airline corporations, grain elevator operations, bus and 
truck operators, ship operators, and pipeline operators.
65
  Of particular relevance for this 
article are the variations to the banking industry as well as the trust and loans corporations.  
The formula for banks is varied from the general formula and while a two factor formula is 
retained, the split is varied to one-third payroll and two-thirds loans and deposits.  For trust 
and loans corporations, the special provisions relate to the definition of gross revenue of the 
permanent establishment, that is, the amount of the sales component.  It includes loans 
secured by lands situated in the province; loans, not secured by land, to persons residing in 
the province; loans to persons residing in a province or country other than Canada in which 
the corporation has no permanent establishment and administered by a permanent 
establishment in the province except loans secured by land situated in a province or country 
other than Canada in which the corporation has a permanent establishment; and business 
conducted at the permanent establishment in the province, other than revenue in respect of 
loans. 
  
Canadian Formulas 
General Formula 
Provincial Profits = 
(½ (provincial payroll/total payroll) + ½ (provincial sales /total sales)) 
x total profits 
 
Bank Formula  
Provincial Profits = 
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(⅓ (provincial payroll/total payroll) + ⅔ (provincial loans & deposits/total loans & deposits)) 
x total profits 
 
 
A summary by Mayer of the advantages and the disadvantages of the Canadian system 
suggests that it represents a balanced compromise between uniformity and coordination, and 
provincial flexibility, meets the criteria of fairness, and has relatively low compliance costs.
66
   
On the other hand, it is also noted that the regime may increase tax competition and lead to 
profit shifting.
67
  
 
4.1.2 The German System
68
 
Very seldom does a comparative analysis of formulary apportionment mention the German 
model for allocating trade tax.  Perhaps the reason is that the formula does not apportion the 
income amongst the taxing authorities, but rather apportions the tax.  That being said, the 
German model does offer insight into possible formulas and for that reason it is briefly 
discussed in this article.  Trade tax has been imposed in Germany since 1936 with the tax 
base consisting of trade proceeds so defined.  The basic tax amount is then determined and 
apportioned amongst those municipalities in which a permanent establishment is maintained.  
The taxable entity extends to affiliated companies with subsidiaries treated as permanent 
establishments where certain conditions (such as residency) are met.  However, it should be 
noted that the German system varies significantly from a unitary tax model in that intragroup 
transactions are not ignored.  Rather, the aggregate tax base includes the profits that arise 
from intragroup transactions, that is, the legal structure of the entity is recognised and 
maintained.    
The formula which is applied to the basic tax amount is a single factor of salary and wages on 
the basis that this represents the costs that are caused by trade activities. However, there are 
various rules as to what is included and, for example, salaries over a certain cap are excluded 
to prevent a bias in favour of the place of central management.  While there is now only a 
single formula applied across all industries, historically there have been two instances of 
industry specific formulas.  The first is retail which is not relevant to this article, but the 
second is the banking, insurance and loan industry.  Until 1974, where an entity was 
considered to fall within this special category, a single factor formula of gross receipts was 
used with receipts attributed to the permanent establishment where the main business 
activities were located.
69
   
It has been suggested that the German system operates satisfactorily and that ‘the system 
effectively prevents double taxation and the results are generally acceptable both for the 
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taxpayers and the affected municipalities. However, the conditions for applying group 
taxation are very strict, and the only flexibility the municipalities enjoy is that of determining 
the rate of assessment’.70 
 
4.1.3 The Swiss System
71
 
The origins of the Swiss tax system can be contrasted with that of Canada and the US as it 
was formed in a way that the Swiss Cantons still enjoy substantial independence from the 
federal state.  Switzerland has a complicated tax system, a comprehensive discussion of 
which is outside the scope of this article.
72
  As with Canada, the taxable unit in Switzerland is 
the single entity and, with the exception of an entity that is set up for tax avoidance purposes, 
not a consolidated corporate group or unitary combined group.
73
  Jurisdiction to tax is based 
on the concept of residence with a main tax residence and secondary tax residences.  For 
companies, the main tax residence will normally be the place of the registered office and 
secondary tax residences will be the location of permanent establishments defined by the 
courts as ‘a lasting physical installation or facility in which a quantitatively and qualitatively 
material part of the technical or commercial activities of an enterprise is exercised’.74    Tax 
bases vary across the cantons, as does the object of apportionment; however, the sum of the 
apportionment fractions cannot exceed 100 per cent.  As Mayer points out, ‘this leads to the 
interesting result that, although the sum of apportionment percentages equals 100%, the sum 
of all attributed portions of tax base does not equal the total tax base of any one canton’.75  
With 26 cantons applying different formulas, and different formulas applying to different 
industries, the Swiss system is a complex one.   
Three different methods are used for apportioning the income of a company; direct, indirect 
and mixed.  Mayer describes the three methods as follows: 
 ‘If the “direct” method of apportionment is used, the aggregate apportionable income 
of the company is distributed among profitable subunits of the company in proportion 
of their separate accounting profits.  If the company is profitable in all cantons and 
potential effects of a Präzipuum are ignored, this method leads to the same results as 
would separate accounting.’76 
 ‘The “indirect” method of apportionment is similar to the practice of the US states and 
the Canadian provinces: a company’s profits are apportioned according to the fraction 
of auxiliary factors such as turnover, payroll and sales that are located within a 
canton.  Applying this method is only admissible when the “direct” method cannot be 
used.’77  
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 ‘The “mixed” method combines the “direct” and the “indirect” method in a two-step 
procedure. First, the total apportionable income is apportioned on the basis of separate 
accounting results (“direct method”) to separate divisions of the company, which may 
be engaged in different lines of business. Subsequently, those part profits are 
distributed within the divisions to the different cantons using the “indirect” method. 
This approach permits a more realistic allocation if a company incorporates separate 
trades of different profitability and it also allows the application of different 
apportionment formulae to the different lines of business within one company.’78 
While the indirect method of apportionment relies on a formula, as stated above, there is no 
one standard applied, as different formulae have been developed for different businesses.  
Interestingly, in the case of banks, the direct method of apportionment is generally applied 
thereby reverting back to a separate accounting approach.  The direct method is also used 
where there are losses to be allocated.   
The outcome of such a complex and Canton specific approach is that a body of case law has 
been developed to deal with the constitutional requirement that prohibits double taxation and 
determine appropriate allocation principles.  That being said, Mayer suggests that the Swiss 
system works relatively well and there are no signs of strong tax competition between the 
cantons.
79
   
 
4.1.4 The United States System 
As stated earlier, the US system is the most widely cited and best understood formulary 
apportionment regime.  It also generally forms the basis for much of the analysis in proposals 
which argue for (or against) the adoption unitary taxation with formulary apportionment at an 
international level.
80
  As such, its analytical significance should not be underestimated.  
Interestingly, however, despite being in existence for more than half a century, the US system 
continues to be an evolving one.  There are countless prior studies of the US formulary 
apportionment system, and, as such, this article does not attempt to undertake another but 
rather it outlines some of the key components.  Examples of factors which have been used at 
some time in the US state formulas include the share of physical assets or intangible assets,
 
the share of employment, the share of sales, manufacturing costs, purchases, expenditures for 
labour, accounts receivable, net cost of sales, capital assets, and stock of other companies.
81
  
While all of these factors have, at some time, been used for the purposes of the United States 
State tax regime, property, payroll and sales are now seen as the acceptable factors.  Each of 
the states applies its own formula, however, commonalities exist.  As a starting point, the 
well-known Massachusetts formula should be noted.  This is a three-factor, equally weighted 
formula consisting of tangible property, payroll expense and sales revenue.  However, many 
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states no longer use this traditional formula, instead placing greater emphasis on sales either 
by double weighting the sales factor or adopting a single-sales factor formula.
82
 
 
US Formulas 
Massachusetts Formula 
State Profits = 
(⅓ (state property/total property) + ⅓ (state payroll /total payroll) + ⅓ (state sales /total 
sales)) 
x total profits 
 
Double Weighted Sales Formula 
State Profits = 
(¼ (state property/total property) + ¼ (state payroll /total payroll) + ½ (state sales /total 
sales)) 
x total profits 
 
Single-Sales Factor Formula 
State Profits = 
state sales /total sales x total profits 
 
4.1.5 The Proposed European Union System 
The long awaited proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) was 
published by the European Commission in March 2011.
83
   The proposal is described as ‘a 
complete set of rules for company taxation. It details who can opt [in], how to calculate the 
taxable base and what is the perimeter and functioning of the consolidation. It also provides 
for anti-abuse rules, defines how the consolidated base is shared and how the CCCTB should 
be administered by Member States under a 'one-stop shop' approach.’84  The discussion 
below only focuses on that part of the report that is relevant to the proposed formula, while 
the unitary business aspect of the proposal was discussed above. 
The EU CCCTB proposal adopts a three-factor equally weighted formula comprising labour, 
assets and sales.  However, as contrasted with previous examples, the labour factor is 
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computed on the basis of payroll and the number of employees, with each item counting for 
half. As an exception to the general principle, where the outcome of the apportionment does 
not fairly represent the extent of business activity, a safeguard clause provides for an 
alternative method.  The CCCTB proposal also includes special apportionment rules for four 
industries: financial institutions; insurance; oil and gas and shipping; inland waterway 
transport and air transport.  
 
The Proposed EU Model 
Member Profits = 
(⅓ (member sales/total sales) + ⅓ (½ member payroll /total payroll + ½ no of member 
 employees/total number of employees) + ⅓ (member assets /total assets)) 
x consolidated tax base 
 
 
The asset factor is defined to consist of all fixed tangible assets. Intangibles and financial 
assets are excluded from the formula due to their mobile nature and the risks of 
circumventing the system. However, where the entity is a financial institution this is varied to 
include 10% of the value of financial assets, except for participating interests and own shares. 
Financial assets are included in the asset factor of the group member in the books of which 
they were recorded when it became a member of the group.
85
  Such a modification is 
arguable seen as necessary because of the significance of these assets to MNFIs.  The sales 
factor, normally defined to mean the proceeds of all sales of goods and supplies of services 
after discounts and returns, excluding value added tax, other taxes and duties and excluding 
exempt revenues, interest, dividends, royalties and proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets 
is also varied for financial institutions.  The sales factor is varied from the general definition 
to include 10% of its revenues in the form of interest, fees, commissions and revenues from 
securities.  Financial services are deemed to be carried out, in the case of a secured loan, in 
the Member State in which the security is situated or, if this Member State cannot be 
identified, the Member State in which the security is registered. Other financial services are 
deemed to be carried out in the Member State of the borrower or of the person who pays fees, 
commissions or other revenue. If the borrower or the person who pays fees, commissions or 
other revenue cannot be identified or if the Member State in which the security is situated or 
registered cannot be identified, the sales shall be attributed to all group members in 
proportion to their labour and asset factors.
86
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4.1.6 The APA/Global Trading System 
There is very little in the way of publically available data on the use of formulary 
apportionment in the MNFI sector.  Clearly, regulations require the use of the arm’s length 
pricing methodologies and, as such, the limited use of methods which resemble formulary 
appointment are found in Advance Pricing Agreements.  The only example of formulary 
apportionment being used for global trading is found in the advance pricing agreements 
entered into in the United States.  These formulas are not true instances of global formulary 
apportionment as they have regard to the particular facts of the individual cases.  Further, 
Advance Pricing Agreements are confidential and little, if any, is revealed about the final 
agreement between the taxpayer and revenue authorities.
87
  In 1994, the Inland Revenue 
Service released Notice 94-40, Global Trading Advance Pricing Agreements,
88
 containing its 
experience and generic information relating to APAs entered into with taxpayers that have 
functionally fully integrated operations in the global trading of financial products.  Notice 94-
40 specifically deals with the IRS experience in entering into APAs with taxpayers who 
engage in operations which involve the transfer of the authority to trade in a ‘book’ of 
positions from trading location to trading location and outlines the method and factors that 
were used to allocate income derived from functionally fully integrated operations.   
The application of Notice 94-40 is very limited as ‘global trading operations of companies 
that are functionally fully integrated are characterized by the centralized management of risk 
and personnel. The business is managed as one global position for purposes of risk 
management rather than several discrete businesses’.89  Where taxpayers genuinely operated 
a functionally fully integrated trading model, the Internal Revenue Service used a profits split 
method of allocating income between the taxing jurisdictions stating that this method ‘reflects 
the contribution of each trading location to the profitability of the global book.’90 
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Notice 94-40: FACTORS USED IN GLOBAL TRADING APAs 
1. The relative value of the trading location (the “value factor”): a direct measure of the 
contribution of a trading location to the worldwide profits of that business. Traders 
were viewed as the most significant resource in generating trading profit or loss for 
the company because they typically had customer lists and knowledge of the market. 
Compensation is generally based upon a salary and a discretionary incentive bonus 
that depends upon contribution to the profitability of the book.  APA participants 
viewed compensation of the traders at a trading location as the best measure of the 
value of a trading location. Accordingly, this factor was weighted more heavily than 
others. 
2. The risk associated with a trading location (the “risk factor”):  a measure of the 
potential risk to which a particular trading location exposes the worldwide capital of 
the organization. It is stated that this factor provides an important indication of the 
contribution of that trading location to the production of gross profits of the business. 
Based on the unique characteristics of each taxpayer, the risk factor was measured in 
several different ways but generally focuses on value and volume of trades. 
3. The extent of the activity of each trading location (the “activity factor”): measured by 
reference to the compensation of key support people at a trading location (for 
example, back office support) or the net present value of transactions executed at a 
trading location (determined by aggregating the present values of the cash flows 
computed at the inception of each transaction for each trading location). 
 
 
The factors used in global trading advance pricing agreements are heavily weighted towards 
payroll with very little emphasis on sales.  While it has not been possible to determine the 
weighting placed on the three factors used, it is unlikely that the ‘risk factor’ is significant.  
Subsequent to Notice 94-40, the US Treasury Department issued proposed regulations 
dealing with the allocation and sourcing of income and deductions among taxpayers engaged 
in global dealing operations.
91
  These proposed regulations, which have not been finalised, 
make it clear that the determination the allocation of income among participants engaged in a 
global dealing operation is to be done on an arm's length basis using the best method rule 
with the four methods available being the comparable uncontrolled financial transaction 
(CUFT) method, the gross margin method, the gross mark-up method or the profits split 
method.   
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4.2 THE FACTORS DEFINED 
In addition to identifying the relevant factors, each factor needs to be defined.  In this part of 
the article the three most common factors of payroll, property and sales are revisited with the 
aim of defining each, as well as outlining the likely issues that would arise if they were used 
in an industry specific formula for MNFIs and the effect on developing nations. 
 
4.2.1 The Payroll Factor 
The payroll factor is generally defined as total employee compensation including salaries, 
commissions and bonuses, and is included to reflect the contribution of labour to the 
generation of the income of the entity.  There are two significant issues in relation to the 
payroll factor which would impact on developing nations.  First, compensation is generally 
much lower in developing countries than it is in developed countries.  As such, there is an 
argument that the factor should take into account the number of employees rather than 
remuneration.  The proposed EU model combines both payroll and number of employees by 
equally weighting the two within the labour factor.  This leads to a second problem of 
outsourcing labour functions as the payroll factor does not generally include independent 
contractors.  Developed nations may also view the payroll factor as discouraging jobs in a 
particular jurisdiction.   
In the context of ensuring that the profits derived in developing nations in relation to MNFIs, 
payroll will be an important factor, especially given it is the most difficult to manipulate.  
However, to ensure an accurate reflection of the cost of labour to MNFIs, there should be no 
distinction between employees and independent contractors.
92
  The proposed CCCTB model, 
which places equal weight on remuneration and number of staff, is also likely to be more 
suited to MNFIs given the high salary and bonuses paid to some staff as compared to others 
who undertake simple retail activities.  Again, failure to recognise number of staff would 
mean that, for example simple retail banking in developing nations, would not be accurately 
reflected in the formula. 
 
4.2.2 The Property Factor 
The property factor, sometimes known as the asset factor, is included in some formulas on 
the basis that capital is an important income producing factor. However, property is also the 
most complex factor to define and value.  Apart from the obvious valuation problems, that is, 
whether historical cost or market value should be used,
93
 the single biggest problem with the 
payroll factor is the issue of intangibles and the allocation to the relevant jurisdictions.  The 
US solution to this problem is to simply remove intangibles from inclusion in the property 
factor where such a factor is still used.  Although, as previously indicated, many states are 
moving away from the traditional Massachusetts formula and either applying less weight to 
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property or removing it altogether.  Canada, on the other hand, has avoided the use of a 
property factor altogether.   
Where a property factor is used in the US, a different definition is generally applied for 
financial institutions.  As Martens-Weiner Explains, ‘the property factor may also include 
intangible property, such as coin and currency, loans related to in-state property and credit 
card receivables if the fees and charges are billed to the state.’94  This is also consistent with 
the approach of the proposed EU CCCTB as discussed above.  While the formula itself 
doesn’t vary, the definition of property does vary to include an amount of 10% of the value of 
financial assets. 
While many of the formulas use property as a factor, this article suggests that it should not be 
included in an industry specific formula for MNFIs if that formula were to accurately reflect 
the profits which should be attributable to developing nations.  To the reader, the obvious 
response may be that given capital is such a significant part of the MNFI’s operations, it 
should be included and also have significant weighting.  Further, given various international 
and domestic standards required of financial institutions, it may be arguably easy to measure.  
However, several issues may arise.  First, not all financial institutions may be caught by such 
requirements.  Second, domestic capital requirements will vary across jurisdictions and their 
compliance is a matter of form rather than an indication of the substantive use of the funds.  
Third, the ultimate purpose of an allocation formula is to allocate profits in a manner which 
accurately reflects the location of the activities which give rise to the profits of the MNFI.  By 
using labour and sales factors in the formula this is achieved with capital (property factor) 
arguably contributing nothing additional to the allocation model.     
Due to the difficulties associated with the property factor, along with a move away from its 
use in domestic jurisdictions, it seems that the most appropriate approach would be to avoid 
the use of this factor in an industry specific formula for MNFIs.  This is especially in light of 
the significant intangible assets held by MNFIs and the ability to easily manipulate this 
factor.  It is also arguable that property is already indirectly represented in the formula as 
property will be associated with the place of labour and potentially sales.  As such, a property 
factor is likely to add little to the ability of a formula to ‘fairly’ allocate the profits.   
 
4.2.3 The Sales Factor 
The sales factor (by destination) is generally viewed as a relatively easy factor to measure.  
However, the most obvious difficulty with the sales factor is the ability to identify the 
location of the sales.  One of the biggest challenges in designing a formula for MNFIs is 
ensuring that the sales revenue is allocated to the appropriate geographic location.  While 
tangible goods may not pose such problems, the sale of intangible goods and services, 
especially intermediary services such as those performed by MNFIs pose the biggest 
problem.  In the case of MNFIs, there is also the incentive to finalise contracts in low tax 
jurisdictions (and, more likely, tax havens).  The solution to this problem is to adopt an 
‘ultimate destination’ test to determine where the services are ultimately used, thereby 
applying a tracing rule.  Certainly, such a rule would result in the most accurate allocation for 
developing nations where bank funding is used to facilitate primary activities such as mining 
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and tourism in those counties.  Retail services to individuals would readily lend themselves to 
such an approach, however corporate clients would pose significant problems given their 
ability to establish subsidiaries anywhere.
95
  In these cases ultimate destination tracing would 
be problematic and, from a practical perspective, the compliance costs and complexities 
associated with such an approach would mean that a great deal of resistance could be 
experienced from all stakeholders.  This would also impose a significant burden on less 
sophisticated taxing authorities than those of developed nations.  As noted above, the use of a 
destination based sales factor also needs to align with a jurisdiction’s taxing connections in 
order to avoid income being allocated to a jurisdiction which has no taxing rights over that 
income.  While this problem has been overcome in the US with either a ‘throw-back’96 or 
‘throw-out’97 mechanism, neither is ideal.   
The earlier discussion in this article centred on the role that MNFIs play in developing 
nations as well as their incentives for becoming multinational and the ‘follow-the-client’ 
motivation for doing so.  As such, a heavily weighted destination based sales factor is 
consistent with the economic substance of MNFI transactions.  MNFIs are operating on 
business incentives (in the current case, to follow clients into developing nations) and, as 
such, there is inelasticity in ultimate destination based sales.
98
  Such an approach also reduces 
the impact of any property and payroll factors thereby allowing nations to encourage 
investment and employment in the jurisdiction.
99
  As Clausing and Avi-Yonah explain, ‘the 
key advantage of a sales-based formula is that sales are far less responsive to tax differences 
across markets, because the customers themselves are far less mobile than are firm assets or 
employment. Even in a high-tax country, firms still have an incentive to sell as much as 
possible.’100  In the case of MNFIs, these entities are following clients into developing 
nations which are involved in traditional businesses such as the extractives industry and 
tourism. 
Because of the difficulties associated with a destination based sales factor for services, 
domestic regimes often locate the income to the location where the services are performed or 
alternatively the location of the customer.  However, to adopt such an approach means there 
is a reversion to an origin based approach which would influence the location of the activities 
of MNFIs, particularly where the customers are also encouraged to operate in low tax 
jurisdictions.  The location of consumption overcomes this problem but poses significant 
problems.
101
  In a similar manner to some US states in relation to intangible property, where 
the location of the income producing activity can be identified, the receipts can be assigned to 
that location.  However, situations may arise where it is not possible to identify a specific 
location and in that case it may be necessary to remove those receipts from the sales factor.
102
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The proposed EU CCCTB model adopts a sales by destination approach and provides that 
sales of goods shall be included in the sales factor of the group member located in the 
Member State where dispatch or transport of the goods to the person acquiring them ends.  If 
this place is not identifiable, the sales of goods shall be attributed to the group member 
located in the Member State of the last identifiable location of the goods, while the supplies 
of services shall be included in the sales factor of the group member located in the Member 
State where the services are physically carried out.
103
 
It should also be noted that under the US model, the financial institutions industry is subject 
to special rules in defining sales.  This is because the financial sector generates receipts which 
are not easily analogous to sales income.
104
  In particular, the ‘sales’ factor is replaced with a 
‘receipts’ factor and ‘may include income from securities and money market instruments, 
interest income from loans secured by personal property in the state, and receipts from credit 
cards if regularly billed in the state’.105 
 
4.3 A PROPOSED FORMULA WHICH ASSISTS DEVELOPING NATIONS 
The purpose of this article was to ultimately propose a formula for MNFIs which ensured that 
not only developed nations received an appropriate allocation of profits but also one that 
accurately reflected the activities being undertaken in developing nations.  It has been 
demonstrated that developing nations are currently ‘missing out’ and, as such, the effect of 
unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is that it would assist these nations to collect 
tax revenue which is due to them.  However, this is only the case where the formula is 
appropriate.   
Prior to proposing a possible industry specific formula for MNFIs it is worth noting the 
theoretical and practical issues which need to be considered in the design of a formula.  The 
choice of factors, as well as the relative weighting is influenced by competing forces.  First 
and foremost, a formula needs to be equitable and efficient.  A system of dividing 
international income must be considered fair by taxpayers and voters and practically 
administrable by taxpayers and governments, as well as being cost-effective in terms of costs 
relative to taxes collected.
106
  At the outset, any formula, whether general or industry specific, 
would need to be politically acceptable to both developed and developing nations and this is 
something that remains untested.  This means that the formula would need to be fair, taking 
into account factors and applying a balanced weighting which results in a distribution of 
income according to what is viewed as sensible and a reflection of where a multinational 
entity actually earns its income.
107
  Generally, this is interpreted to mean that factors such as 
the location of offices, people and sales should be used in the formula with a weighting that 
minimises distortions.  However, there is an inherent incentive for individual jurisdictions to 
achieve a formula that places emphasis on factors which have a significant presence within 
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the jurisdiction.
108
  There is also the problem that developing countries may be disadvantaged 
where emphasis is placed on such factors as labour and capital that have lower costs in 
developing counties.
109
  As such, they are unlikely to agree to a formula which weighs these 
factors heavily. 
Any proposal for a formulary apportionment model for MNFIs must have the ultimate goal of 
allocating income on an economically sound basis, rather than addressing aggressive tax 
planning as its primary motivation.
110
  A clear observation from the discussion above is that 
there are significant differences in how a formulary apportionment regime is implemented, 
with varying degrees of agreement.  The contrast between Canada and the US is an obvious 
example of this.  In Canada there are uniform rules on the factors, the weighting and the tax 
base, while in the US states can apply their own factors and weightings as well as adjust the 
categorisation of income.  At an international level, to avoid distortions, minimise complexity 
and lessen opportunities for aggressive tax planning, a significant amount of agreement is 
required.  McLure argues that at an international level all key elements of the system, apart 
from tax rates, should be consistent across countries.
111
  However, it cannot be assumed that 
the same formula should be applied to all industries, and as we have seen with domestic 
regimes, financial institutions are one such industry where there has either been a variation on 
the standard formula or a special industry specific formula.  Such an approach may also need 
to be taken at a global level and becomes particularly significant when differing economies 
are taken into account.  Failure to do so may result in a bias towards those jurisdictions where 
MNFIs are traditionally based and against developing nations where those same institutions 
are now aggressively following clients to ensure profits. 
Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment only works to the extent that the factors of the 
formula allocate income based on an economically sound basis.  Developing nations will 
generally argue for greater emphasis on a destination based sales factor on the basis that it is 
those nations where the market is located.  However, it can be seen from the above discussion 
that there are numerous combinations of both factors and weightings that can be adopted.  
Each nation has the incentive to place greater emphasis on the factors which maximise 
taxable income in its jurisdiction.  However, this will be weighed against broader economic 
policy, such as attracting foreign investment.  Generally, the tendency has been for fewer 
factors to be used, with a resulting combination of factor/s at origin (assets and payroll) and 
factor/s at destination (sales) making up the adopted formulas.  However, in terms of both the 
factors and the weighting, the outcome of any analysis suggests that there is that there is no 
one ‘correct’ formula.  As such, much of the argument will centre on country bias, dependent 
on whether consumption factors or destination factors produce the best result, and ultimately 
depend on what the majority can agree on.   
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It is arguably the responsibility of developed nations to ensure that if a move towards unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment were made, that an inclusionary approach is adopted 
to ensure that developing nations are afforded an equal opportunity to participate in the 
process and raise their concerns.  It is the developing nations themselves which experience 
the problems first hand.  This is evident within the work of the United Nations which is one 
body that works closely with developing nations.  In May 2013, the United Nations released a 
document complementary to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations Guidelines known as the Practical Manual on Transfer 
Pricing for Developing Countries.  Within this document, Chapter 10 is specifically devoted 
to the country practices of Brazil, China, India and South Africa with each of these nations 
contributing their own dialogue.  In particular, the chapter outlines the approach to transfer 
pricing followed by these nations which are considered developing and emerging economies 
which have become increasingly powerful in the global economy in recent years.  Each of the 
four nations which contributed to Chapter 10 was afforded the opportunity to set out its 
viewpoints and experiences of applying the arm’s length principle. Such a practice would 
need to be adopted if unitary taxation with formulary apportionment were to be successful. 
As a starting point, the discussion above supports the view that an equally weighted two-
factor formula of labour and sales for MNFIs is the most likely to be broadly accepted by 
both developed and developing nations, as well as meet the criteria of fairness and equity.  At 
a global level an origin based labour factor and a destination based sales factor is the most 
appropriate for MNFIs.  The biggest difficulty will be the sales factor and, as Avi-Yonah, 
Clausing and Durst explain, determining the location for sale of certain services such as 
financial services ‘will require toleration of some degree of reasonable estimation and 
generally will require some restraint in enforcement. In addition, owing to the wide range of 
situations in which sales can arise, regulations will need to be detailed, and a rulings process 
will be needed to provide flexibility for particularly difficult situations.’112  The same authors 
also propose statutory language to account for this scenario and suggest that ‘It is anticipated 
that regulations will provide that revenues for the provision of banking, insurance, brokerage, 
or other financial services will be treated as earned by the related party that is resident for 
income tax purposes in the country in which such revenues can be identified, with reasonable 
certainty in view of the records and other information available to the taxpayer, with services 
provided to individuals resident, property located, or active business activities conducted 
within that country.’113 
The most significant effect of adopting such a formula is that the ability by the MNFIs to 
shift risk is removed.  Currently, these institutions are able to shift their risk to low tax 
jurisdictions resulting in developing nations failing to tax the economic activity which occurs 
in their jurisdiction.  Unfortunately, the current OECD BEPS project, with the maintaining of 
the arm’s length standard, seems to accept that this is the case and suggests that the system 
which allows this to happen will be maintained.  While the BEPS project suggests that it will 
take into account the needs of developing nations, adopting such a stance fails to do so. A 
consideration of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment however recognises that 
developing nations would benefit in a fair and equitable manner.   
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5. Conclusion 
MNFIs, through their intermediary role of facilitating finance to core industries, play a 
significant role in the economic advancement of developing nations.  However, their role is 
much more significant than simply facilitating finance and extends to helping create an 
environment where all multinationals pay their ‘fair share’ of tax in the jurisdiction where the 
profits are earned.  The obvious way to achieve this is to encourage MNFIs to act responsibly 
in their promotion of financial products and arrangements.  However, this does not address 
the behaviour of the banks themselves as taxpayers.  The economic substance of the activities 
of MNFIs operating in developing nations is located in those jurisdictions, that is, the MNFIs 
are earning profits based on their transactions and clients in the developing nations. As such, 
unitary taxation with formulary apportionment provides a viable industry specific solution to 
a fair and equitable allocation of those profits.  Consequently, this article proposes that 
unitary taxation based on formulary apportionment be implemented on an industry specific 
basis with the obvious industry being MNFIs.  There is already evidence that the current 
jurisdiction and allocation rules do not work for MNFIs and that developing nations are 
suffering because of it.  As such, acceptance of this model as superior for the specific 
industry of MNFIs may not be as onerous as its acceptance for multinational entities 
generally. 
The model proposed in this article, which meets the needs of not only developed nations but 
also takes into consideration the needs of developing nations and emerging economies, that is 
based on both theoretical and pragmatic considerations is an equally weighted two-factor 
formula of labour and sales where labour reflects both remuneration and number of staff.  
Ideally, this formula should be applied to all of the income of the MNFI on a combined 
income bases.  However, this article also recognises the difficulties associated with such an 
approach.   
  
 
33 
 
Appendix 1: Legislative Definitions of a “Financial Institution”  
 
Country  Source Definition 
EU Article 98 of the Proposed 
CCCTB Model 
The following entities shall be regarded as financial institutions:  
(a) credit institutions authorised to operate in the Union in accordance with Directive 
2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council;  
(b) entities, except for insurance undertakings as defined in Article 99, which hold financial 
assets amounting to 80% or more of all their fixed assets, as valued in accordance with the 
rules of this Directive.  
Australia Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 An AFI or Australian financial institution" means any of the following Australian entities: 
(a) a body corporate that is an ADI (authorised deposit-taking institution) for the purposes 
of the Banking Act 1959 ; 
(b) a person who carries on State banking within the meaning of paragraph 51(xiii) of the 
Constitution; 
(c) a registered entity under the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001  
India Reserve Bank of India Act 1934 i. Asset Finance Company: An AFC is a company which is a financial institution carrying 
on as its principal business the financing of physical assets  
ii. Investment Company:  IC means any company which is a financial institution carrying on 
as its principal business the acquisition of securities, 
iii. Loan Company: LC means any company which is a financial institution carrying on as its 
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principal business the providing of finance whether by making loans or advances or 
otherwise for any activity other than its own but does not include an Asset Finance 
Company 
iv. Infrastructure Finance Company: IFC is a non-banking finance company a) which 
deploys at least 75 per cent of its total assets in infrastructure loans, b) has a minimum 
Net Owned Funds of Rs. 300 crore, c) has a minimum credit rating of ‘A ‘or equivalent d) 
and a CRAR of 15% 
v. Systemically Important Core Investment Company (CIC-ND-SI) : CIC-ND-SI is an 
NBFC carrying on the business of acquisition of shares and securities which satisfies 
certain conditions. 
vi. Infrastructure Debt Fund: Non- Banking Financial Company (IDF-NBFC) : IDF-NBFC is 
a company registered as NBFC to facilitate the flow of long term debt into infrastructure 
projects. 
vii. Non-Banking Financial Company - Micro Finance Institution: NBFC-MFI is a non-
deposit taking NBFC having not less than 85% of its assets in the nature of qualifying 
assets which satisfy certain criteria. 
viii. Non-Banking Financial Company – Factors (NBFC-Factors): NBFC-Factor is a non-
deposit taking NBFC engaged in the principal business of factoring. 
United States Bank Secrecy Act 31 USC 5312 
(a)(2) 
(A) an insured bank (as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
U.S.C. 1813(h))); 
(B) a commercial bank or trust company; 
(C) a private banker; 
(D) an agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States;  
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(E) any credit union; 
(F) a thrift institution; 
(G) a broker or dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.); 
(H) a broker or dealer in securities or commodities; 
(I) an investment banker or investment company; 
(J) a currency exchange; 
(K) an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money orders, or similar 
instruments; 
(L) an operator of a credit card system; 
(M) an insurance company; 
(N) a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels; 
(O) a pawnbroker; 
(P) a loan or finance company; 
(Q) a travel agency; 
(R) a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the 
transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an informal 
money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating 
the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional 
financial institutions system; 
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(S) a telegraph company; 
(T) a business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and boat sales; 
(U) persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; 
(V) the United States Postal Service; 
(W) an agency of the United States Government or of a State or local government carrying 
out a duty or power of a business described in this paragraph; 
(X) a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment with an annual gaming revenue of 
more than $1,000,000 which-- 
 (i) is licensed as a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment under the laws of any 
State or any political subdivision of any State; or 
(ii) is an Indian gaming operation conducted under or pursuant to the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act other than an operation which is limited to class I gaming (as defined in 
section 4(6) of such Act); 
(Y) any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the 
Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a 
substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is 
authorized to engage; or 
 (Z) any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters. 
United States FATCA The term “Financial Institution” means a Custodial Institution, a Depository Institution, 
an Investment Entity, or a Specified Insurance Company.  
The term “Custodial Institution” means any Entity that holds, as a substantial portion of its 
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business, financial assets for the account of others.  
An entity holds financial assets for the account of others as a substantial portion of its 
business if the entity’s gross income attributable to the holding of financial assets and related 
financial services equals or exceeds 20 percent of the entity’s gross income during the 
shorter of: (i) the three-year period that ends on December 31 (or the final day of a non-
calendar year accounting period) prior to the year in which the determination is being made; 
or (ii) the period during which the entity has been in existence.  
i) The term “Depository Institution” means any Entity that accepts deposits in the ordinary 
course of a banking or similar business.  
j) The term “Investment Entity” means any Entity that conducts as a business (or is 
managed by an entity that conducts as a business) one or more of the following activities or 
operations for or on behalf of a customer:  
(1) trading in money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, 
derivatives, etc.); foreign exchange; exchange, interest rate and index instruments; 
transferable securities; or commodity futures trading;   
(2) individual and collective portfolio management; or  
(3) otherwise investing, administering, or managing funds or money on behalf of other 
persons.  
k) The term “Specified Insurance Company” means any Entity that is an insurance 
company (or the holding company of an insurance company) that issues, or is obligated to 
make payments with respect to, a Cash Value Insurance Contract or an Annuity Contract.  
United 
Kingdom 
The Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Prescribed 
Financial Institutions) Order 
Prescribed financial institutions 
(1)  All financial institutions are prescribed for the purposes of section 192B(4) of the Act, 
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2013 in so far as it applies—  
(a) to parent undertakings of a recognised UK investment exchange (within the 
meaning of section 192B(5) of the Act), and 
(b) for the purposes of Part 12A of the Act as that Part is applied in relation to the 
Bank of England by paragraph 17 of Schedule 17A to the Act (further provision in 
relation to exercise of Part 18 functions by Bank of England). 
(2) Financial institutions of the following kinds are prescribed for the purposes of section 
192B(4) of the Act in so far as it applies to parent undertakings of a qualifying 
authorised person—  
(a) an insurance holding company; 
(b) a financial holding company; 
(c) a mixed financial holding company. 
Note: The Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(Prescribed Financial Institutions) Order 2013 states the following: 
The definition of “financial holding company” derives from European law which contains a 
definition of “financial institution”. Hence it is appropriate to define “financial institution” 
when used in that context. However the definition of “financial institution” will not apply to 
the references to “financial institution” in article 2 of the Order. This reflects the fact that 
“financial institution” is used in FSMA (see for example section 192B(4), as inserted by 
section 27 of the Financial Services Act 2012) without a definition. “Financial institution” is 
a generally understood term which is used, again without definition, in other legislation 
(including the Banking Act 2009). The term includes an entity which itself provides financial 
services or which operates financial market infrastructure or whose business involves the 
ownership of, or management of, such entities. It would therefore be inappropriate for the 
definition of “financial institution” in the Order to apply to the references to “financial 
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institution” in article 2 which are closely related to the operation of section 192B of FSMA. 
Canada Canada Revenue Agency: 
GST/HST memorandum 17.6 
September 1999 
1. Bank 
2. Corporation that is licensed or otherwise authorized under the laws of Canada or a 
province to carry on in Canada the business of offering to the public its services as a 
trustee 
3. Person whose principal business is as a trader or dealer in, or as a broker or 
salesperson of, financial instruments or money 
4. Credit union 
5. Insurer or any other person whose principal business is providing insurance under 
insurance policies 
6. Segregated fund of an insurer 
7. Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation 
8. Person whose principal business is the lending of money or the purchasing of debt 
securities or a combination thereof 
9. Investment plan 
10. Person providing tax discounting services referred to in section 158 of the Act 
11. Corporation deemed under section 151 of the Act to be a financial institution 
 
